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Abstract
This parer focuses on an idea of Asia-Pacific "Security Communities," which Admiral Dennis
C. Blair, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), is promoting.
Blair s concept aims to not only foster dependable expectations of peaceful change but also
enhance regional readiness for combined operations. Blair's Security Communities concept is
not just a declared policy and USPACOM is undertaking various initiatives based on this con-
cept, ranging from multilateralized exercises to strategic coordination. This concept deserves
serious attention since it has a potentiality to change the existing ineffective combination of
bilateralism and multilateralism in the region.
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Since the end of the Cold War, the security framework of the Asia-Pacific has. been
reorganized to address the changing geo-political environment. The role of the United
States and its bilateral alliance systems-the so-called "hub and spokes" system-
remains central, but the security focus has shifted from global strategic balancing to
regional stability.1' On the other hand, Asia-Pacific region has for the first time sought
on their own to establish region-wide multilateral mechanisms aimed at addressing the
new challenges of the region and to supplement the U.S.-centered alliance system.2'
While there has been a relatively wide consensus on the necessity of the U.S.-centered
alliance system and concurrent multilateral regional dialogues like the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) , multilateral regional dialogues did not play an important role
in addressing various regional contingencies including the conflict in East Timor and
the Asian economic crisis.3'On the other hand, it may be difficult to rely too much on
the "hub and spokes" system since American involvement in regional contingencies is
neither guaranteed nor always desirable.4'
To improve the current regional security structure, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Com-
mander in Chief of the U. S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), based in Honolulu,
Hawaii, has been promoting the idea of Asia-Pacific "Security Communities"
vigorously.5' Blair defines Security Communities as "groups of nations that have
dependable expectations of peaceful change."6' Balance of power mindsets, Blair
argues, should be replaced by Security Communities way of thinking.7* According to
1) Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996) , pp. 263-
273.
2) Ibid., pp. 273-279.
3) Paul Dibb, David D. Hale and Peter Prince, "Asia's Insecurity," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp.
17-18.
4) Robert A. Scalapino, "The US Commitment to Asia," Journal of Security Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September
1995),p.73.
5) Dennis C. Blair, Testimony before the U. S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year ZαガPosture
Shhち7 March 2000 (hereafter Testimony on Fiscal Year 2001), (available at http:〝www.pacom.mil/
speeches/sst2000/000307db.pdf, accessed 1 April 2001) ; Dennis C.Blair, Test moの/ befor  U. S. Senate
Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statemen右27 March 2001 (hereafter Testimony on
Fiscal Year 2002) , (available at http:〝www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2001/010327blairtestimonySASC.pdf,
accessed 1 April 2001) ; Dennis C Blair and John T. Hanley Jrリ"From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-
Pacific Security Arrangements," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2001) , pp. 7- 17.
6) Blair, Testimony on Fiscal Year Zαフ'1, p. 34.
7) Blair and Hanley,坤. cit, p.9.
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him, Security Communities include "treaty alliance signatories, participants in a non-
military organization such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or groups of nations joined
by geographic considerations or common concerns."8'
As we can easily see, Blair has got ideas from theoretical works on a pluralistic secu-
rity community, originally developed by Karl Deutsch, and recently by Emanuel Adler
and Michael Barnett.9'Deutsch and his associates defined a security community as a
group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a "real assurance
that the members of that community will not fight each o血er physically, but will settle
their dispute in some o仇er way."10'According to Deutsch, peaceful change cannot be
assured without relationship based on a sense of community.ll'Recently, the concept of
security communities has been revitalized and reconceptualized by constructivist
scholars. Adler and Barnett argue仇at security communities are socially constructed
and path dependent.12'They also present a conceptual framework for understanding
how security communities emerge.1
Compared to these academic works that are theoretically sophisticated, Blair has
used the ideas of security community in a fairly flexible manner. Even while Blair refers
to Deutsch or others'academic works, Blair's concept is not always compatible with the
academic developments, as will be argued. Also, various initiatives that Blair and
USPACOM have promoted in the Asia-Pacific are not directly deduced from Deutsch or
others theoretical works. However, divergence from academic arguments does not
reduce the value of Blair's proposal. Blair's Security Communities concept, putting
much emphasis on combined military cooperation on specific security tasks, deserves
serious attention for its attempts to address diverse, often incompatible, challenges that
U. S. policy in the Asia-Pacific faces. The purpose of the paper is to explain why.14
First, this paper will give an overview of Blair's Security Communities proposal and
Blair, Testimony on Fiscal Year 2<α7% p. 34.
9) Karl Deutsch et all, Political Communiかand the North Atlantic Area (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1957) ; Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ed., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pre-
ss,1998).
10) Deutsch et al, op. tit, p.5.
ll) Ibid., p.36.
12) Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A framework for the study of security communities," in Alder and
Barnett, ed, op. at, p. 49.
13) Adler and Barnett, ibid., p. 37-48.
14) For convenience sake, to indicate the policy presented by Blair,仙is paper usually uses the possessive case
like "Blair's proposal" or the capitalised term "Security Communities" like "Security Community concept".
When this paper indicates the academic concept cultivated by Deutsch and his followers, it will use the
possessive case like "Deutschian security community" or "Deutsch's security community".
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confirm its two main objectives. After describing the various initiatives of USPACOM
to date undertaken to achieve these objectives, this section will survey regional response
to USPACOM's initiatives and examine whether and how these initiatives can contrib-
ute to the different objectives.
Secondly, it will be identified what kind of Security Communities are likely to emerge
in the mid-to long-term future and how their boundaries will be defined. Also, to clarify
the nature of Blair's concept, this paper will assess whether USPACOM's efforts are
likely to bring about Deutschian security communities or other type of security
arrangements.
Thirdly, this article will assess the likely impact of the Security Communities concept
upon current regional security framework, consisting of the U. S.-centered bilateral alii-
ance network and formal/informal multilateral security fora. It will be argued that
enhanced security cooperation among U. S. security partners can transform the existing
regional security framework into a more effective and structured one.
The last section will identify some conditions that may be necessary or desirable in
order for Blair's Security Communities concept to work as a basis of effective security
framework in the region.
Blair's Security Communities Concept and USPACOM's Initiatives
Blair's Security Communities concept seems to have two main objectives. One objec-
tive is to develop dependable expectations of peaceful change in the region. Another
objective is to enhance the will and capabilities for combined operations of countries in
the region to address regional emergencies and instabilities. Although the latter objec-
tive tends to take a back seat, it is no less important than the former one.
Blair and Hanley ascribed the following attributes to Security Communities: ( 1 )gen-
uinely do not plan or intend to fight each other; ( 2 )are willing to put collective efforts
into resolving regional points of friction; ( 3 ) are willing to contribute armed forces and
other aid to UN mandated operations to support diplomatic solutions; ( 4 ) are willing to
contribute to humanitarian operations; and ( 5 )are willing to plan, train and exercise
their armed forces toge仇er to build trust, confidence, and capabilities to conduct these
kinds of operations.1
15) Blair and Hanley, op. cit, p. 16.
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We can see these expected attributes reflect the two objectives of the Security
Communities concept. But important questions are: how can the Security Communities
"grow from a concept to a substantial approach for promoting security and peaceful
development?"16'To answer this question, we will have to see a variety of initiatives
under the name of the Security Communities concept.
The concept of Security Communities is not just a declared policy. Under the con-
cept, USPACOM is undertaking various initiatives to shape the future security environ-
merit in the Asia-Pacific. These initiatives may be divided loosely into "enhancing
regional security cooperation" and "enriching bilateralism."
Enhancing Regional Security Cooperation
The first pillar of U. S. efforts to establish Security Communities is Henhancing
regional security cooperation". The purposes of enhancing regional cooperation are
"to improve regional readiness for combined operations and to expand the set of states
m the region that share dependable expectations of peaceful change."17'Of note, the
emphasis is put on tangible security cooperation to counter new types of security tasks,
including peacekeeping, search and rescue, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance,
rather than mere confidence building measures (CBMs).
First, USPACOM has concentrated on merging bilateral exercises with its Asian secu-
nty partners into regional multilateral exercises. A series of multilateral exercises
flourished in 2000-2001. In October 2000, Singapore hosted "Pacific Reach," a multilat-
eral submarine rescue exercise.18'In May 2001, USPACOM carried out three annual
bilateral exercises-りTandem Thrust" with Australia, HCobra Gold" with Thailand, and
'Balikatan" with the Philippines-under the common concept of "Team Challenge," us-
mg UN Chapter VII (peace enforcement) , non-combatant evacuation operation and cri-
sis management scenarios.19'Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) , in
which a U. S. Navy task force exercises with naval and other forces from the region,
16) Blair, Testimony on Fiscal Year2002, p. 36
17) Ibid., p. 32.
18) Naval forces from the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Singapore participated
Yomiun Shimbun (Japan), "Kaiji Takokuseki Enshuu ni Hatsusanka (The Naval Self Defense Force is
participating in a multilateral exercise for the first time) ," 3 October 2000.
19) William S. Cohen, Annual Rゆort to the President and the Congress 2001 (Washington DC: The Pentagon, 2001) ,
pp. 3ト32; u. S. Embassy in Thailand Press Release, ``New Regional Multilateral Exercise Team Challenge to
include Cobra Gold," April 5, 2001 (available at http:〝www.usa.or.th/news/press./200Vnrot020.htm, accessed
l November 2001).
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began in Indonesia in May 2001 continued in the Philippines and Thailand in June, in
Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei in July and August.20'Between 12-22 June 2001, the
first Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise (MCMEX) was held, intending to
tram participating forces in practicing detection, identification and disposal procedures.21
Second, USPACOM has led task-oriented security dialogues to foster cooperation
among regional militaries. Of note, USPACOM-sponsored activities seem to go beyond
the scope of usual security dialogue and aim at tangible military results. USPACOM has
begun web-based collaboration through the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) and
share sensitive, but unclassified, information such as standard procedures and doctrine
for combined operations.22'They also have held Multilateral Planning Augmentation
Team (MPAT) conference to train a cadre of military planners from key Asia-Pacific
nations to improve capability of rapid and flexible augmentation of a multilateral
headquarters. 23)
Third, USPACOM has promoted military education and training to underline the
Security Communities.24'Under the Foreign Military Officer Education (FMOE)
program, m particular, the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program, USPACOM has carried out exchanges of officers for military education. The
IMET is not a new program, but now, it is redesigned to enhance regional readiness for
combined operations.
Finally, USPACOM has proposed Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
(ACTD) projects in collaboration w仙Australia.25'This project intends to improve the
sharing of logistics information among coalition partners. This program grew out of the
lessons in East Timor, where U. S. forces failed to exchange information on the arrival
of personnel and equipment with other peacekeepers.26)
Since the United States has encouraged regional partners to enhance their own
defense capabilities for a long time, these initiatives may not look so new. But emphasis
20) Lyall Breckon, "Wanted: More Attention from the United States," Comparative Connections, Vol. 3, No. 2
(July 2001), pp. 56-57.
21) Ibid. p. 57. It included participants from Australia, China, France, Ind輪Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Papua
New Guinea, Russia, the ROK, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as the United States.
22) U. S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing, 7 March 2000 (available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Mar2000/tO3072000 t307uspc.html.accessed 1 April 2001).
23) Blair, Testimony on Fiscal Year喝p. 34.
24) Blair and Hanley, op. cit, p. 15.
25) Sheldon W. Simon, "New Military Cooperation but Continuing Political Tension,"物rative Connections,
Vol.3, No. 1 (April 2001), p.51.
26) Ibid., p. 51.
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has shifted significantly. First, recent efforts assume future coalition operations or
combined ones. Second, for effective coalition operations, the United States is encourag-
ing its potential coalition partners to collaborate each other. Traditionally, the United
States has encouraged each regional security partner to enhance its capabilities
individually. Third, confidence and trust among participants is expected as a by-
product. In sum, traditional efforts to enhance regional partners'capabilities are
reorganized under the concept of Security Communities with new policy emphasis and
initiatives.
Enriching Bilateralism
The second pillar of Security Communities building isりenriching bilateralism."
According to Blair and Hanley,りEnriched bilateralism principally involves greater con-
sultation and policy coordination with the nations of the region regarding the full range
of U. S. policies that affected interests, going beyond those that affect only bilateral
arrangements."27'During the Cold War, bilateral alliances mainly focused on mutual
defense among allies. Now the alliances in the Asia-Pacific-notably, the Japan-U. S.
alliance-come to emphasize their role in maintaining Hregional" peace and stability.
Blair and Hanley write,りU. S. consultation with security partners regarding third
countries before setting policy and taking action is becoming more important as secu-
nty challenges become more regional and interdependent."28'
Enriching bilateralism enables multiple parties concerned in a particular issue work
together. A notable example is the establishment of trilateral planning and coordination
between the United States, Japan, and the ROK to address North Korea's threat. Trilat-
era! efforts include the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation (KEDO) ,
the Perry Process, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG).29)
Ralph A. Cossa, the executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, name this
trend a Hvirtual alliance", which serves all three nation's security interests but does not
require formal trilateral alliance.
This trend is also reinforcing the bilateral security ties between Japan and the ROK
that have been traditionally weak. In October 1998, ROK President Kim Dae-Jung and
27) Blair and Hanley, op. a,ま, pp. 10-ll
28) Ibid., p. ll.
29) Ralph A. Cossa, "U. S.-Japan-Korea: Creating a Virtual Alliance," PacNet Newsletter, No. 47 (3 December
1999) , (available at http:〝www.csis.org/pacfor/ ac4799.html, accessed 1 April 2001).
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Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo issued a joint declaration that pledged to increase defense
exchanges and consultations and to establish regular bilateral cabinet meeting.30'Then,
joint naval search and rescue exercises were carried out and a bilateral hotline for crisis
management was established. Recent events such as the controversy over the new
version of a Japanese history textbook and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visit to
Yasukum Shrme enraged South Korean public opinion and led to the cancellation of the
visit by the chairman of也e ROK joint chiefs of staff to Japan and也e port call by Mar-
ltime Self-Defense Forces vessels at Incheon. But on the other hand, the TOCG meetings
were held in Tokyo in September 2001 and reconfirmed the importance of trilateral
coordinated policy toward North Korea.
Similarly, Australia has expanded its security ties with the United States to address
regional uncertainty and instability since the end of the Cold War.31) Cossa has pointed
out that Australia is a silent partner in the emerging U. S.-Japan-Korea virtual alliance,
given Canberra's military commitment to the UN Command, its active participation in
KEDO, and its stated support for other initiatives such as the Four Party Talks and
TCGO process."32'Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer's ambitious
but controversial proposal on establishing a security forum consisting of Australia, the
United States, Japan, and possibly the ROK seems to follow a similar way of think-
ing.33)
.
Regional Responses and the Feasibility of the Concept
Blair's proposal and various related initiatives have sparked ambivalent regional
responses. On the one hand, they have triggered regional concerns. Some Asian
countries are sensitive to China's reaction. Philippines Foreign Undersecretary Lauro
Baja, Jr. said that joining multilateral military exercises might onlyexacerbate
matters.34'Many defense experts criticized Downer's proposal on a security forum as
30) Japan -Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan -Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty -first
G刑tury, issued on 8 October 1998 (available at http:〝www.mo fa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html,
accessed 21 November 2001).
31) See Defence 2000; Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: Australian Department of Defence, 2000) , (available
at http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/WPAPER.PDF, accessed 12 November 2001).
32) Ralph A. Cossa, U. S. Asia Policy: Does an Alliance一哉税がPolicy Still Make Sense? (Hawaii: Pacific Forum
CSIS, 2001) , (available at http:〝www.csis.org/ jacfor./issues usasia.pdf, accessed 10 November 2001) , p. 18.
33) About Downer's proposal, see The Ccmberra Times (Australia) , "US flags security forum with Australia," 31
July 2001. About the following China's response, see The Strait Times (Singapore) "China moderates criti-
cism of security plan," 2 August 2001.
34)且BC Summaりof World Broadcas税"Manila undecided over US proposal to join allied military exercise," 30
March 2001 (original source: Phi物如Daily Inquirer vreb site, 28 March 2001).
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sending the wrong signal to China.35) In addition, some countries like Thailand and
Philippines worry that multilateralization would weaken their bilateral ties with the
United States.36'On也e other hand, there have been many positive responses. For
example, Singapore's Deputy Premier and Defense Minister Tony Tan said也at current
security risks like piracy and ecological disaster were multilateral in character and only
multilateral exercises could meet the challenge.37'Philippines President Arroyo backed
the U.S. initiative to multilateralize military exercises in her foreign policy speech in
July.38'The increasing number of participants in multilateral exercises seems to demon-
strate that the countries in the region are basically receptive towards USPACOM's
initiatives. Even Japan, traditionally hesitant to commit to multilateral exercises, has
shown interest.39'Uneasy experience in operations in East Timor and other low
intensity conflicts, including piracy and terrorism, have obliged regional countries to
accept the necessity of regional readiness.4
Even if many regional countries were receptive to USPACOM's initiatives, would
Blair's proposal be feasible? As we have seen, the Security Communities concept
assumes quite a simple idea, that is, enhanced security cooperation on common tasks
will build confidence and trust among participants as well as improve their readiness for
combined operations. Is this really a tenable concept?
Intensified security cooperation on common tasks is likely to achieve one of two
objectives of the Security Communities concept, that is, enhancement of regional
countries will and capabilities to address regional emergencies and instabilities. Diverse
initiatives are designed to give regional countries opportunities to work with others on
specific tasks, understand merits of multilateral operations, find difficulties in combined
operations, and improve ineffectiveness. Even Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
such as peacekeeping operations, search and rescue, counter-terrorism, piracy control,
drug control and humanitarian assistance are difficult more than it appears and need to
be trained and coordinated in advance. It seems reasonable to assume that tangible
regional cooperation on common task will enhance and regional countries'will and
35) The Canberra Times, op. cit.
36) Asahi Shimbun (Japan) , ``Beigun Enshuu wo Sakugen e (The U. S. force will reduce exercises) ," 12 April 2001.
37) The Strait Times (Singapore) , "Singapore to join Cobra Gold exercise this year," 14 January 2000
38) Lyall Breckon, "Solid in Support of the U. S‥..So Far," Comparative Connections, Vol. 3, No. 3 (October 2001) ,
p.66.
39) Yomiuri Shimbun, op. dt.
40) Asahi Shimbun (Japan) , "Ajia no Takokukan Enshu (Asia's multilateral exercises) ," 10 June 2000, and Ibid.,
"Bei no Tounanajia Takokukananpo (U. S. multilateral security policy in Southeast Asia) ," 18 October 2000
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capabilities to address regional emergencies, if not easy. Similar efforts in Europe- Brit-
ish call themりDefence Diplomacy"-have achieved tangible result in enhancing
interoperability.4" In addition, Blair's proposal has strength, that is, it can make use of
accumulated institutional assets including technical interoperability, information
provision, and decision-making procedures that the United States has developed with its
security partners.42'If such bilaterally developed institutional assets were adaptable to
multilateral operations, transaction cost for enhancing interoperability would be rela-
tively low.
On the other hand, it may appear difficult to see a causal relation between regional
cooperation on common tasks and development of dependable expectation of peaceful
change. It seems too naive to assume仇at HWorking side-by-side on these missions builds
confidence and trust among the participants as it improves operational capabilities."43)
Proposed regional security cooperation seems to improve military effectiveness
through enhancing interoperability, but military effectiveness is not always transferable
to political cohesion. Nevertheless, states may develop close security ties to promote the
notion that the security of states is interdependent.44'While we can not place absolute
reliance on causal relation between closer security collaboration and emergence of
"dependable expectations of peaceful change" or sense of community, task-oriented
security cooperation is likely to provide another channel to foster mutual understanding
and find Ha way that want to exert more influence in the region to do so in constructive
ways that contribute to regional security."45'Also, we should note that it is the United
States as a hegemon who is promoting the ideas of Security Communities. If the United
States uses its hegemonic coercion adequately and domestic conditions in regional sec-
ondary states allow their reception of norms articulated by the hegemon, secondary
states may internalize the concept of Security Communities through hegemon-led
"socialization" process.46)
41) About Defence Diplomacy, see Strategic Surv.砂1998/1999 (London: IISS, 1999) , pp. 38-53.
42) About institutional asset, see Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the
Cold War," International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2000) , pp. 705-735.
43) Blair, Testimony on Fiscal Year 2002, p. 33.
44) Adler and Barnett, op. tit, p. 50.
45) Blair, Testimony on Fiscal Year2Lフ昭p. 33.
46) See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," International i
turn. Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 283-315.
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What Kind of Security Communities?
If the USPACOM's initiatives worked successfully, what kind of Security
Communities would emerge? In other words, what kind of groups of nations is expected
to develop as a result of enhanced pattern of regional cooperation? At a first glance,
Blair's proposal seems to show an optimistic expectation to build a single inclusive secu-
nty community for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. But, judging from proposed
measures to develop Security Communities, Blair and USPACOM adopt a more careful
and pragmatic approach.
As already seen, Blair's Security Communities are expected to develop through secu-
nty cooperation on common tasks. The point to observe is that Blair seems to consider
that a variety of communities should be tailored according to level or scope of common
tasks. The area of common tasks ranges from traditional mutual defense to various
OOTW missions. Regarding mutual defense, existing bilateral alliances should continue
to work. They also have functioned and will function as stabilizing mechanism of
relation among allies. In addition to formal alliances, "virtual alliance" like trilateral
security cooperation among the U. S.-Japan-the ROK may be organized against a deter-
mmate aggressor and become prepared to Hput collective efforts into resolving regional
points of friction."47'In lower intensity tasks such as peacekeeping, search and rescue,
and humanitarian support or widely acceptable cases like recent anti-terrorist
campaign, looser ad hoc coalition is likely to emerge.48'The idea that a variety of Secu-
nty Communities can be tailored according to diverse common tasks is one important
characteristic of Blair's proposal.
This adaptive character of Security Communities concept will lead to another
important characteristic: conditional membership. Membership of Security Communities
is neither regionally inclusive nor strictly exclusive. It may be proper to say membership
of each Security Community is conditional according to the scope and level of common
tasks. According to Blair, common tasks will be carried out by ‖group of like-minded
nations getting together and pursuing common goals where they can, generally without
47) Blair and Hanley, op. tit, p. 16.
48) About regional cooperation related to anti-terrorist campaign since ll September 2001, see The Strai缶Times
(Singapore) , "Multilateral War-That's the way to beat terrorism-Adm Blair," 27 October 2001.
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formal treaty organizations or formal structures, but who cooperate on a range of issues
in order to develop and resolve them peacefully. "49) Non-allied countries like Vietnam
and China are not excluded. Technically, as long as a state has the will and capacity to
cooperate on common tasks, it can be a member. But when mutual defense matters, the
membership of a group of nations addressing the tasks is likely to become restrictive
and each nation's interest tends to diffuse (can China cooperate with the United States
and the ROK to fight against North Korean attack?). Even when nations share
interests, expected costs may make them reluctant to participate in cooperation. On the
other hand, if needed tasks are low intensity or widely acceptable ones, membership can
be fairly open.
However, is it appropriate to call groups of nations, which Blair expects to emerge,
"security communities"? As stated above,也e concept Hsecurity community" has its
roots m Karl Deutsch's academic works, which defined a security community as a group
of people that had become integrated to the point也at there is a Hreal assurance that
仇e members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their
dispute in some other way."50'According to Deutsch, a sense of community or we-fee一
ing is indispensable for the formation of a Deutschian security community. A sense of
community is a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties, of we-feeling, of mutual iden-
tification and of successful prediction of behavior.5" Similarly, in recent theoretical
developments propelled by constructivist scholars, shared identities, values, and
meanings as well as many-sided interaction and reciprocal attitude are the basis of
community.52)
If we follow these academic definitions of security community literally,仇e term
"security community" may not be applicable to some components of Blair's Security
Communities. We can consider bilateral alliance between the United States and its allies
such as Japan and Australia as Deutschian security communities. It is difficult to imag一
me that the United States and its allies use force and threat of force against each other
to settle their disputes. They have developed tight military coordination including sensi-
tive intelligence sharing and interdependent military posture. Moreover, they have
developed a sense of community and emphasized shared values. For example, The U. S.
49) U. S. Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing, 7 March 2000.
50) Deutsch et al, op. tit, p.5.
51) Deutsch et al, op. cit, p.36.
52) Adler and Barnett, op. tit, p. 31.
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Security Strategy for the血t Asia -Pacific Region l湖said, "the United States and Japan
will continue building a global partnership based on our shared values, mutual interests
and complementary capabilities."53'
But on the other hand, military-to-military cooperation on low intensity risks with
flexible membership does not seem to converge on a clear common identity. How can
we define "we" given that there is little consensus on who constitute "we"? In
comparison, in the case of the trilateral relationship among the U. S.-Japan-the ROK, it
is relatively easy to define the boundary of a security community because its
membership is limited and "they" can be easily defined. But even in this case, it is
uncertain if the three countries could form a we-feeling.
It is doubtful whether USPACOM's current initiatives will lead to a clear sense of
community, and form security communities in Deutschian sense. But the declared
proposed goal like "dependable expectation of peaceful change", endorsed by hegemonic
leadership, may make a sense of community more attainable than without such a
clearly defined goal. Ikenberry and Kupchan point out that a hegemon can exercise
power by altering the substantive beliefs of leaders of other nations as well as
manipulating material incentives through threats of punishment or, promise of
reward.54'Also, to foster a sense of community among the United States and its friendly
countries may be easier than among Asia-Pacific countries as a whole. Secretary of St-
ate James Baker and President Clinton alike called for a community in the Asia-Pacific,
but their proposals do not seem to trigger a formation of a sense of Asia-Pacific
community.55' In comparison, Blair's approach is more limited and appears more
achievable.
At any rate, to form a security community needs years of experiences and only time
will tell if the Blair's concept will result in Deutschian security communities. But even
though Blair's proposal cannot bring about Deutschian security communities, it does not
detract from the potential usefulness of USPACOM's initiatives. USPACOM's efforts
are likely to improve regional readiness for combined operations and facilitate future
53) U. S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the払t Asia一物Region 1998 (Washington
DC: the Pentagon, 1998) , (available at http:〟www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/, accessed 1 April 2001) ,
Chapter6.1.
54) See托enberry and Kupchan, op. cit.55) James A Baker III, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,"物Affairs, Vol.
70, No. 5 (Winter 1991/1992), p. 18; William J. Clinton, Remarks in Address to the National Assembly of the
Republic of Korea, 10 July 1993 (available at http:〝www.fas.org.!spp/starwars/offdocs/w930710.htm, accessed
lApril2001).
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coalition building in the region. Emphasis of coalition and combined operations has
potential impact on existing regional security framework, which consists of bilateral
security ties and inclusive multilateral dialogue, as will be examined next.
Impact on Regional Security
USPACOM's recent initiatives under the Security Communities concept try to address
several challenges, which the existing bilateralism and multilateralism have not dealt
with. They encourage regional security cooperation on common tasks among regional
countries, especially among U. S. security allies and partners. If it succeeds, the Security
Communities concept may lead to a new regional security framework with a new baト
ance between bilateralism and multilateralism.
Restructuring "Hub and Spokes"
As we will see, theりhub and spokes" system, with almost no security collaboration
among U. S. allies or partners, has fundamental flaws. Security Communities concept
seems to restructure theりhub and spokes" system by expanding security collaboration
among U. S. allies and partners.
The first flaw of bilateralism in the Asia Pacific is its inefficiency. As stated above,
American allies and partners have developed some degree of interoperable assets
through their individual relationship with the United States. But, since there is little
coordination and collaboration among U. S. allies and other partners,也eir readiness for
combined operations will remain immature. Even OOTW missions require peacetime
collaboration including combined exercises and information sharing, as stated above.
Multinational operations have different characteristic from bilateral operations,
therefore, multilateral exercises and training become critical.
Second, separated bilateral ties with the United States rely too much on U. S.
leadership and burden. Without U. S. leadership,仇e ‖hub and spokes" system cannot
play any role more than a disorderly crowd. To overcome this fundamental weakness of
the "hub and spokes" system, Morimoto suggests that a loose framework based on the
"hub and spokes" compensate a reduction in the U. S. presence and fulfill the same
56) Morimoto Satoshi, "A Security Framework for the Asia/Pacific Region," Journal of Securi,砂Studies, Vol. 18,
No. 3 (September 1995), p. 226.
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functions as the former U. S. presence.56'If the regional readiness develops well in such
a way, it is likely to relax American uneasiness at its counterparts'free riding as well
as to relieve regional countries'obsessive anxiety about the U. S. presence.
Finally, theりhub and spokes" system cannot foster dependable expectations of peace･
ful change even among U. S. allies and friends. Japan-the ROK tie has remained fragile
and encompasses a source of tensions. Same thing can be said in the ASEAN where con-
tinued disputes remain. As already said, we cannot place absolute reliance on the expec-
tation that closer security collaboration will develop dependable expectations of peace-
ful change. However, collaboration on common security tasks may provide another
channel to foster mutual understanding and trust. In addition, American hegemonic
leadership may succeed in making its allies and partners internalize cooperative norms.
Engaging China
USPACOM's Security Communities concept also tries to address one of the most
important U. S. security dilemmas in the post Cold War: whether containment or
engagement should form the U. S. policy toward China. The possibility of new formal
multilateral/minilateral treaties or alliances is deliberately excluded from the Security
Communities concept, taking the concerns of countries other than allies and friends,
especially China, into consideration.
Even conditionally, Blair's proposal is open to China. Blair clearly rejected the idea
that Security Communities concept is a scheme for containing China in his testimony
before仇e Senate and welcomed Chinese involvement in regional security cooperation
such as their contribution to peacekeeping in Cambodia and CIVPOL contingent in East
Timor.57'Blair also suggested there that the some of restrictions in USPACOM's
interaction with armed forces of some nations in the region should be eliminated, for
example in the IMET program.58'But, as we will see, questions still remain on whether
and how much China will accept Blair's proposal.
Coalition of the willing
Lack of formal treaties or organizations is not necessary to restrict habits of
cooperation. Rather, this characteristic may provide much flexibility with the concept
57) Blair, Testimony on Fiscal Yeaγ2002, p. 37.
58) Ibid., p.39.
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of Security Communities. The diversity in threat perception, strategic posture, and his-
toncal experiences of the Asia Pacific suggests that ad hoc or task specific multilateral
collaboration is more likely to be workable than the whole regional and fixed security
framework.59'The more narrowly the scope of collaboration is limited, the more its
success is likely and less its cost in the case of failure become. At the same time, unwill-
mgness to form a new formal treaty or organization may help to maintain the core
function of bilateral alliances, that is, collective defense, by not extending collective
defense guarantee beyond existing allies.
The informal character of Security Communities seems to match well the post Cold
War tendency that "coalitions of the willing" approach has become preferred more than
before.60'According to Richard Haass, the coalition approach "differs from alliances
and mstitutionalism in its eschewal of formal organizations and not requiring broad or
complete consent. At its core is the idea of selected nations states coalescing for narrow
tasks or purposes-and in some cases disbanding once the specific aim has been
accomplished. Membership is open to those able and willing to participate."81'The Gulf
War coalition, the KEDO, peacekeeping in East Timor, and recent anti-terrorist cam-
paign are notable examples of the coalition approach.
But, the concept of Security Communities goes beyond ad hoc coalition. Haass pointed
o鴫"Informal coalitions take time to forge…The lack of common equipment, military
doctrine, and common experience is likely to limit effectiveness. So, too, will the lack of
resources."62'Various initiatives under the Security Communities concept try to address
such weakness by developing the will and capacity of regional countries which is pre-
requisite for successful coalitions. In that sense, USPACOM's initiatives will bring about
'well prepared" ad hoc coalitions. They are ad hoc because missions and member of the
coalitions is not determined in advance. They are well prepared because readiness for
combined operations is being er血anced ahead of crises.
EI血anced regional readiness for combined operations "provides the United States
wi也competent coalition partners so that our armed forces need not shoulder the entire
59) Ralph A. Cossa, U. S. Asia Policy: Does an Alliance-Based Policy Still Make Sense?, p. 19-22.
60) See Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1998) ; Patrick M.
Cronin, "Coalition Warfare Facts, Fads and Challenges," Strategic Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, (Spring 1994) , p. 67-
70; Stephen M. Walt, "Coalitions," in Patrick M. Cronin ed., 2015/ Poweγ and Progress, (Washington DC: Insti-
tute for National Strategic Studies, 1996) , Chapter 3.
61) Haass, op. ci,ま, p. 93.
62) Ibid, p. 97.
63) Blair, Testimony on Fiscal Year2002, p. 33.
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load."63'In contingencies where the U. S. vital interest is not at stake, the U. S. is likely
to provide only supporting capabilities such as planning support, communications
systems, intelligence and logistics without providing majority of forces and
weapons.641 This may be a convenient way for the U. S. to maintain its influence in
regional contingencies without producing intolerable casualties and other costs.
The complimentary combination of bilateralism and multilateralism became cliche in
the regional security discourse in the post Cold War Asia-Pacific. But real challenge is
how to combine what kind of bilateralism and multilateralism. Blair's Security
Communities concept seems to present one innovative and pragmatic response to the
challenge. While maintaining the core function of existing bilateral alliances, the United
States encourages its regional counterparts to play more regional roles and collaborate
further. Bilateral relations are expected as a basis for regional cooperation. Embryonic
multilateral security institution is not abandoned, but Blair's proposal emphasizes the
role of more informal regional security cooperation based on American bilateral secu-
nty ties not only as a measure to address regional contingencies but also as a measure
to develop expectation of peaceful change. In the Security Communities concept,
bilateralism and multilateralism are interconnected more synergistically than now.
Conditions for Success
Blair's Security Communities tries to satisfy several, sometime competing,
requirements in the U. S. policy toward Asia-Pacific: to improve regional readiness for
combined operations to address regional instability and uncertainty; to reduce U. S.
burdens while maintaining its influence in the region; to minimize Chinese fears of con-
tamme叫　and to expand the set of states in the region that share dependable
expectations of peaceful change. However, some conditions must be satisfied in order
that the concept will function as a basis of stable regional security order.
Managing Multi-Layered Security Framework
The concept of Security Communities is likely to lead to a following multi-layered
regional security framework: alliance fort collective defense; enriched bilateral ties and
64) Walt called such approach "vertical coalition", see Walt, op. cit.
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well prepared, ad hoc coalition of the like minded countries for regional contingencies;
and multilateral security forum for the long term trust building. The UN will also play
an important role. As Scalapino pointed out, the coexistence of various levels of
activities may "produce strong contradictions and varying degrees of tensions."65'The
tensions among different security arrangements should be reduced to manageable level.
Since each component has its own strength and weakness, the scope and limitation of
each component should be clearly recognized.
Concert of Big Powers6
Merits of the concept would be seriously damaged if the concept provokes strong
objection of any major state and trigger disputes among major powers, especially China.
Though USPACOM is cautiously trying to engage China, China may view American
initiatives as a measure to contain China. China has sometimes expressed its concern
about U. S.-led multilateral cooperation and it is uncertain whether China would accept
this concept.67' Scalapino said, "Agreements can be achieved on specific issues, as
indicated, but consensus on the full range of issues that are critical to Asia's future is
not possible."68' Complete consensus among major powers may not be necessary for
Security Communities, but some sort of acceptance will be desirable.
Political Support from Allies and Partners
In order that Security Communities will grow from a mere concept to a substantial
approach for regional security, effective capabilities of regional countries are
indispensable. However, it is still unclear that regional countries can and want to make
sufficient contribution beyond their own defense. To enhance regional readiness for
combined operations, stable political support in each regional country is necessary. A
degree of regional political supports for Security Communities concept is influenced by
relevance to their own national interest and their security norm. As we have seen,
reaction of American partners in the region is not hostile, but still ambivalent. If the
concept of Security Communities neglects interests, concerns, capabilities or norms of
65) Scalapino,珍. cit, p. 81.
66) About the applicability of concert system in Asia, see Amitav Acharya, "A Concert of Asia?" Survival, Vol.
41, No. 3, (Autumn 1999), p. 97.
67) Yomiuri Shimbun, "Kaiji Takokuseki Enshuu ni Hatsusanka."
68) Scalapino,珍. cit, p. 80.
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regional countries enormously, it will remain a nice looking but dysfunctional concept
like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
U. S. Commitment
Without continuous U.S. commitment, the concept of Security Communities cannot
work. Without U. S. efforts as a catalyst or mediator, recent security collaboration
between Japan and the ROK would be unimaginable. U. S. initiative would help regional
countries realize the possibility and potentiality of developing regional military and
security cooperation on common tasks. The United States has also provided regional
countries opportunity to enhance their readiness for combined operations. In crisis,也e
United States may take some leadership in forming a coalition with diplomatic pressure,
even if it wants to play only a supporting role in operations. But despite血e importance
of U.S. role, political foundation of the concept of Security Communities seems neither
wide nor deep.69'It is unclear that the Congress and the U. S. administration will sup-
port the crux of the concept continuously and sufficiently.
Expanding the Scope of Cooperation
Blair's Security Community concept focuses narrowly on military -t0- military
cooperation. However, the aim of the concept seems to be better achieved by expanding
the scope of cooperation to include other foreign and economic policy areas particularly
because proliferating complex emergencies require coordinated approach among
political, humanitarian and military elements.7
Managing Old and New Dilemmas
Security Communities cannot extinguish all of dilemmas. Rather, they can produce
new dilemmas. For example, international intervention may provoke antagonism in the
intervened country. In the case of East Timor, anti-Australian sentiment was growing in
Indonesia.71'Old issues will also remain. It is unlikely that the Security Communities
concept can function in diminishing existing intense confrontations, for example, dispute
69) About fragmented character of U. S. Asian policy, see The Strait Times (Singapore), "Bush's point man for
Asia combines empathy and realism," 26 January 2001.
70) See John Mackinlay, "Beyond the Logjam: A Doctrine for Complex Emergencies," Small Wars
Insurgencies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 1998), pp. 114-131.
71) Harold Crouch, "Don't Rush to Write off Our Indonesian Links," PacNet Newsletter, No. 36 (September 1999) ,
(available at http:〝www.csis.org/pacfor./ ac4799.html, accessed 1 April 2001).
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between the PRC and Taiwan, while it may work as a source for international efforts to
address these disputes. The viability of the Security Communities concept depends upon
whether it can reduce dilemmas and uncertainties to manageable level.
Conclusion
Blair's concept of Security Communities seems to present a new way of promoting
regional stability. If Blair's proposal succeeded, it would have great implications for
regional security framework. Regional countries, especially U. S. security counterparts,
would be finally interconnected to address regional security issues. Also, enhanced
regional readiness may provide the United States competent coalition partners and help
the United States to reduce its security burden. Despite its idealistic appearance, the
Security Community concept reflects various U. S. interests and careful considerations
for regional countries'reaction.
It is uncertain if Security Communities concept will be able to eliminate or lessen bal-
ance of power thinking as Admiral Blair insists. Nevertheless, this concept seems to
open a new dimension of regional security order, that is, tangible security cooperation
on specific common tasks among like-minded regional countries. For a long time, secu-
nty cooperation on common tasks among regional countries, even among U. S. security
partners, was beyond imagination. The concept of Security Communities and various
ongoing initiatives make such cooperation imaginable, backed by accumulated invalu-
able assets that the United States has developed with friendly countries in Asia-Pacific.
This epistemological turn may become one of driving forces to shape future security
environment in the region.
